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Summary: Public procurement liberalisation under the WTO’s Govern-
ment Procurement Agreement (GPA) is a gradual and evolving process. 
In parallel with this process, however, the interests of public procure-
ment liberalisation are also served through the interaction of the GPA 
with other international, regional and domestic instruments. The pa-
per presents and analyses three such instances of synergy created as 
a result of this interaction, all of which assist in the better application, 
implementation and enforcement of the principles proclaimed and the 
provisions enshrined under the GPA. First, the principles, standards 
and procedures of the GPA are promoted through a number of inter-
national and regional texts, including model laws and soft law in-
struments. Second, the successful enforcement of GPA relies on the 
remedies systems available under domestic legal orders. Third, the 
possible improvement of the remedies system under the GPA may be 
inspired by similar templates offered under other international and 
regional systems. Against this background, the paper concludes by 
remarking that the end goal of public procurement liberalisation relies 
on the synergies generated from the dialogue and interaction between 
the actual text of the WTO’s GPA and the relevant international, re-
gional and domestic instruments and does not necessarily rest on the 
concessions achieved in the context of the WTO’s GPA itself. 
1 Introduction
Public procurement liberalisation under the WTO’s Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA) is a gradual and evolving process. Each 
time, each negotiation results in more concessions and aims to bring 
further sectors under the Agreement’s ambit and to draw more partici-
pants. Starting from this basic premise, the present paper seeks to assert 
whether in the process of the GPA’s development its text interacts with 
other international, regional or domestic instruments in such a man-
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ner that the interests of public procurement liberalisation are further 
enhanced and promoted. The paper argues that there are three specific 
instances that explicitly support this proposition. 
The paper starts off by offering an overview of the history and main 
characteristics of the GPA. This analysis is not presented in a vacuum. 
On the contrary, it seeks to prove that a step-by-step approach towards 
public procurement liberalisation has been taken by the WTO under the 
GPA. The paper goes on to argue that while public procurement liberali-
sation under the GPA evolves, its goals are also assisted, promoted and 
furthered with its interaction with other international, regional and do-
mestic instruments. Thus, the article traces and analyses three instances 
of such synergies. First, the principles, standards and procedures of the 
GPA are considered which are promoted through a number of interna-
tional and regional texts, including model laws and soft-law instruments. 
Second, it is held that the successful enforcement of the GPA relies on the 
remedies systems available under domestic legal orders. It is then argued 
that a possible improvement of the remedies system under the GPA may 
be inspired by similar templates offered under other international and 
regional systems. 
Against this background, the article concludes by arguing that the 
end goal of public procurement liberalisation is neither a sprint nor a 
one-man show. Its success depends rather on a long process of evolution 
and development where the GPA interacts with various international, re-
gional and domestic texts, thus creating synergies that are pivotal in 
implementing its enshrined principles and in the enforcement of its very 
provisions.    
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2 Landmark steps towards public procurement liberalisation in the 
context of the WTO
2.1 The GPA: Its architecture and evolution from 1979 to 19941
The GPA’s architecture and structure rest on seven pillars. First, 
the GPA initially took and still has the form of a plurilateral agreement, 
meaning that it is binding only on those WTO members that have de-
cided to join it. Second, it relies on two fundamental principles, namely 
those of national treatment and non-discrimination. Third, the Agree-
ment lays out specific requirements and standards for the procurement 
procedure, thus seeking to guarantee that public tendering is conducted 
in a transparent and competitive manner. Fourth, the GPA started out as 
an agreement of limited scope, meaning that only specific types of pur-
chases conducted by specific governmental entities were intended to be 
caught under it. Fifth, the GPA’s text lays out its general principles and 
goals. In contrast, the different obligations each member state commits 
to undertake under the GPA’s provisions are defined and further speci-
fied in Schedules attached thereto.2 Sixth, each party is free to exclude 
the application of the Agreement in respect of specific areas, as well as 
vis-à-vis specific other parties. For example, Matsushita, Shoenbaum and 
Mavroidis use the reciprocal exemptions initially applied between the US 
1 See generally Bernard Hoeckman and Petros Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public 
Purchasing: The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (University of Michigan Press 
1997); Sue Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (Sweet & Maxwell 1996, 
ch 15); Sue Arrowsmith and Arwel Davies (eds), Public Procurement Global Revolution (Klu-
wer Law International 1998); Sue Arrowsmith, John Linarelli and Don Wallace, Regulat-
ing Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives (Kluwer International 2000); 
Adrian Brown and Craig Pouncy, ‘Expanding the International Market for Public Procure-
ment: The WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement’ (1995) 3 International Trade Law 
Review 69; G de Graaf and PA Trepte, ‘The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement’ (1997) 
6 Public Procurement Law Review CS70; G de Graaf and M King ‘Towards a More Global 
Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT  Government Procurement 
Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round’ (1995) 29(2) The International Lawyer 
435; Auge Haagsma, ‘Gordian Knots in Relation to the GPA: Myth or Reality?’ in Laurence 
Gormley (ed), Gordian Knots in European Public Procurement Law (Bundesanzeiger 1996); 
Bernard Hoeckman and Petros Mavroidis, ‘The WTO’s Agreement on Government Procure-
ment: Expanding Disciplines, Declining Membership?’ (1995) 4 Public Procurement Law 
Review 63; Pablo Olivera, ‘Defining the Scope of Covered Entities under the WTO Agreement 
on Government Procurement and the EC Procurement Rules’ (1997)  Public Procurement 
Law Review 1; Hans-Joachim Priess ‘Public Procurement Law in the European Union: The 
New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement’ (1996) 2 International Trade Law Review 
51; Arie Reich ‘The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: The Pitfalls of Pluri-
lateralism and Strict Reciprocity’ (1997) 31 Journal of World Trade 126; Robert Anderson 
‘Current Developments on Public Procurement in WTO’ (2006) 15(6)  Public Procurement Law 
Review NA 167. 
2 World Trade Organization, Agreement on Government Procurement, 1869 UNTS 508. 
Overview available at <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_app_agree_e.
htm> accessed 18 December 2015. 
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and Japan and the US and Norway in the context of the GPA to illustrate 
the way in which the exemption systems works under the GPA.3 Last, the 
GPA includes a ‘built-in agenda’ for the text’s improvement, which is sub-
stantiated inter alia through extensions of its coverage and the further 
elimination of any remaining discriminatory measures. 
In this context, the major challenge regarding the GPA has histori-
cally been its expansion, both in terms of the member states’ participa-
tion thereto and regarding its scope and coverage.4 Consequently, the 
GPA does not constitute an instrument that promotes public procure-
ment liberalisation in a block form all at once. This is reflected in its 
history.  
The first agreement on governmental procurement was concluded 
in 1979 during the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations.5 The 
text proclaimed the fundamental principles upon which the Agreement 
was premised and the goals this sought to serve. It further envisaged a 
number of administrative requirements and procedures that came with 
the aim of harmonising the procurement procedure among WTO mem-
bers who were party to the Agreement and of ensuring that the relevant 
processes were to be conditioned by transparency. Its material as well as 
its subjective scope was extremely limited. 
The Tokyo Agreement was modified for the first time in 1988.6 The 
introduced amendments mainly sought to broaden the Agreement’s 
scope. More specifically, the Agreement was extended to cover any kind 
of procurement activity (including purchases, leases, rentals and hire 
purchase contracts) instead of only specific types of procurement as per 
the previous regime. Moreover, the Agreement’s scope was widened to 
the extent that the threshold of covered purchases was lowered to SDR 
130,000. What is more, locally established suppliers would now also be 
able to benefit from national treatment and non-discrimination princi-
ples. Further, the amended Agreement also added changes seeking to 
ensure that the procurement procedure was conditioned by enhanced 
3 Mitsu Matsushita, Thomas J Schoenbaum and Petros C Mavroidis, The World Trade 
Organization (OUP 2006) 745. 
4 Sue Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer Law International 2003); 
Robert Anderson, ‘Current Developments on Public Procurement in the WTO’ (2006) 6 Pub-
lic Procurement Law Review NA 167; Anne Blank and Gabrielle Marceau, ‘The History of 
the Government Procurement Negotiations since 1945’ (1996) 5 Public Procurement Law 
Review 77.  
5 World Trade Organization, Agreement on Government Procurement. Text available at 
<https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/tokyo_gpr_e.pdf> accessed 18 December 
2015. 
6  World Trade Organization, Agreement on Government Procurement, Revised Text 
of 1988. Text available at <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpa_rev_
text_1988_e.pdf> accessed 18 December 2015. 
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transparency. In so doing, a clear requirement was introduced stipulat-
ing that procurement entities should not request or receive advice from 
directly interested enterprises with regard to the technical standards to 
be implemented.7 
Further negotiations took place in the context of the Uruguay Round 
with the aim of bringing forward further extensions regarding the Agree-
ment’s scope and coverage. As a result, a new GPA was agreed upon on 
15 December 1993 and signed in Marrakesh in April 1994.8  The 1994 
amendments extended the GPA’s coverage (i) to also capture services and 
specified works, and (ii) to apply to local governments, including sub-
national governmental authorities.
The focus of the above analysis reflects the way in which public 
procurement liberalisation policy has been shaped in the context of the 
WTO. The 1979 Agreement merely served as the first step towards public 
procurement liberalisation. It was a small-scale experiment implemented 
for the types of purchases and governmental entities each party felt more 
comfortable opening up to in order to test any possible benefits gener-
ated from liberalisation. Following this trend, each new amendment or 
revision of the Agreement has in essence sought to bring more types of 
purchases under its ambit by relying on the perception that the benefits 
flowing from the GPA would lure more WTO member states into adher-
ing to the Agreement and more GPA parties into submitting additional 
materials to the Agreement’s scope. Based on the above, it becomes evi-
dent that the overall objective of public procurement liberalisation has 
not been proclaimed as a goal to be achieved overnight. On the contrary, 
it constitutes a long-term target to be attained through a long-running 
process of negotiation and implementation.  
2.2 And then came the revised GPA: from expansion to modernisation 
Within two years of the implementation of GPA 1994, the GPA par-
ties started once again renegotiating the GPA’s text according to the re-
spective built-in provision of the 1994 Agreement. The negotiation was 
concluded in December 2011 and the outcome was formally adopted in 
March 2012. The revised WTO GPA entered into force on 6 April 2014.9 
7 Matsushita,Schoenbaum and Mavroidis (n 3) 744. 
8 World Trade Organization, The 1994 Agreement on Government Procurement. Text 
available at <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_01_e.htm> accessed 18 
December 2015.   
9 World Trade Organization, ‘Revised WTO Agreement on Government Procurement Enters 
into Force’ (News Items, 7 April 2014) <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/
gpro_07apr14_e.htm> accessed 18 December 2015. See Section 3.1.2 below. 
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The conclusion of the revised GPA constitutes a landmark in the 
timeline of public procurement liberalisation. The revised GPA marks the 
end of what was nearly 10 years of negotiation. From a substantive point 
of view, the revised GPA contributes to the expansion, modernisation and 
simplification of public procurement liberalisation.10   
In line with the past amendments, the revised GPA extends and 
expands the Agreement’s coverage and scope. In particular, the revised 
GPA now includes 150 additional central government entities in the Eu-
ropean Union as well as certain sub-central government agencies.11 What 
is more, the Agreement’s scope has once more been broadened to fully 
cover construction service contracts and service contracts. At the same 
time, certain parties to the revised GPA agreed to cover ‘Build-Operate-
Transfer’ contracts and also agreed to lower the monetary thresholds for 
already covered contracts. 
The revised GPA further serves the goal of facilitating future par-
ties’ accession thereto.12 In particular, the relevant literature picks up 
four different ways in which the revised GPA is considered to contribute 
towards additional parties’ participation. First, by increasing the sum 
of market access opportunities available by virtue of the agreement, the 
revised GPA presents prospective parties with additional benefits and op-
portunities. Second, the GPA’s special and differential treatment provi-
sion has been revised in such a way that it offers ‘an array of possible 
transitional measures that can be tailored to the needs of specific ac-
ceding parties without eroding the principles of reciprocity’.13  Therefore, 
10 See Section 3.1.2 below. 
11 See generally, for a particular focus on the debate regarding the GPA’s coverage of Can-
ada’s central governmental agencies, David Collins, ‘Canada’s Sub-Central Coverage Under 
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement’ (2008) 17(1)  Public Procurement Law 
Review 21.
12 Valeria Guimaraes de Lima e Silva, ‘The Revision of the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement: To What Extent Might It Contribute to the Expansion of Current Member-
ship?’ (2008) 17(2) Public Procurement Law Review 61: Guimaraes argues that the im-
provements to the agreement benefit current members more than they stimulate further 
accessions. There should be a shift from the emphasis on transparency towards a direct 
emphasis on market access. 
13 Based on its development needs, and with the agreement of the parties, a developing 
country may adopt or maintain one or more of the following transitional measures, during 
a transition period and in accordance with a schedule, set out in its relevant annexes to 
Appendix I, and applied in a manner that does not discriminate among the other parties: 
a price preference programme, provided that the programme provides a preference only for 
the part of the tender incorporating goods or services originating in the developing coun-
try applying the preference or goods or services originating in other developing countries 
in respect of which the developing country applying the preference has an obligation to 
provide national treatment under a preferential agreement, provided that where the other 
developing country is a party to this Agreement, such treatment would be subject to any 
conditions set by the Committee;  and is transparent, and the preference and its application 
in the procurement are clearly described in the notice of intended procurement; an offset, 
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developing countries have extra interest to accede to the GPA now that 
the greatest variety of transitional measures is available to them.  Next, 
the revised GPA is conditioned overall by further flexibility, the lack of 
which was one of the major concerns developing countries repeatedly 
raised against the previous GPA. Last, the profile of the Agreement has 
been raised further by virtue of its revision in such a way that it might 
exercise a psychological effect on WTO members who are not party to the 
Agreement, urging them to accede. 
Following the above thoughts, it comes as no surprise that a sub-
stantial number of WTO members have recently expressed their interest 
in joining the GPA. Two additional WTO members, Montenegro and New 
Zealand, acceded formally to the revised GPA on 15 June 2015 and 13 
July 2015, respectively.14 At the same time, the WTO’s Committee on 
Government Procurement has reported substantial progress in negotia-
tions with WTO members seeking accession to the GPA. To name just a 
few, Ukraine submitted to the Committee a draft final offer on 26 May 
2015, Costa Rica and Thailand have applied for observer status in the 
committee, while Australia recently launched its bid to join the GPA.15 
The changes to the GPA revealed so far fall squarely under the pre-
viously noted attempts to develop and broaden the Agreement’s subject 
matter, as well as its material and personal scope. What differentiates the 
2014 Agreement from its previous amendments, though, is that this time 
the text has been completely revised so that the structure is simplified 
and the text is modernised overall. 
First of all, the text of the 2014 GPA clarifies and simplifies the 
relevant provisions and terms. In particular, the revised GPA includes 
definitions of the relevant terms for the first time and restructures the 
stipulated rules and procedures with a view to making the text more un-
derstandable and user friendly.16  
provided that any requirement for, or consideration of, the imposition of the offset is clearly 
stated in the notice of intended procurement; the phased-in addition of specific entities or 
sectors;  and a threshold that is higher than its permanent threshold.
14 World Trade Organization, ‘Montenegro and New Zealand to Join the WTO’s Agreement 
on Government Procurement’ (News Items, 29 October 2014) <https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/news_e/news14_e/gpro_29oct14_e.htm>;  World Trade Organization, ‘New Zealand 
Ratifies Revised WTO Procurement Pact (News Items, 13 July 2015) <https://www.wto.
org/english/news_e/news15_e/gpro_13jul15_e.htm; World Trade Organization, ‘Montene-
gro Ratifies Revised WTO Procurement Pact’ (News Items, 15 June 2015) <https://www.
wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/gpro_15jun15_e.htm> all accessed 18 December 2015. 
15 World Trade Organization, ‘Australia Launches Bid to Join Government Procurement 
Pact’ (News Items, 3 June 2015) <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/
gpro_05jun15_e.htm> accessed 18 December 2015. 
16 See generally Guimaraes de Lima e Silva (n 12).
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The revised text further seeks to modernise the Agreement’s content 
and to ‘tune’ the parties’ obligations to the current procuring practices. 
More specifically, the 2014 GPA seeks to serve the interests of public pro-
curement policy modernisation through three different means. First, the 
revised GPA responds to the growing need for electronic public procure-
ment. In so doing, Article VII.1 of the revised Agreement stipulates that: 
For each covered procurement, a procuring entity shall pub-
lish a notice of intended procurement in the appropriate pa-
per or electronic medium listed in Appendix III, except in the 
circumstances described in Article XIII.  Such medium shall 
be widely disseminated and such notices shall remain readily 
accessible to the public, at least until expiration of the time-
period indicated in the notice.
Second, the 2014 GPA takes due account of the request for greater 
flexibility in the procuring procedure especially by reducing the notice 
time, provided that the relevant notices are posted electronically. Article 
XI.7 foresees respectively that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision in this Article, where a 
procuring entity purchases commercial goods or services, or 
any combination thereof, it may reduce the time-period for 
tendering established in accordance with paragraph 3 to not 
less than 13 days, provided that it publishes by electronic 
means, at the same time, both the notice of intended procure-
ment and the tender documentation.  In addition, where the 
entity accepts tenders for commercial goods or services by 
electronic means, it may reduce the time-period established 
in accordance with paragraph 3 to not less than 10 days.
Last, the new GPA guarantees greater transparency regarding award 
information by explicitly laying out specific procedures for the publica-
tion of the award notices and the maintenance of relevant documenta-
tion. In particular, according to Article XVI: 
2. Publication of Award Information 
Not later than 72 days after the award of each contract cov-
ered by this Agreement, a procuring entity shall publish a 
notice in the appropriate paper or electronic medium listed 
in Appendix III.  Where the entity publishes the notice only in 
an electronic medium, the information shall remain readily 
accessible for a reasonable period of time.  The notice shall 
include at least the following information:
a description of the goods or services procured;
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the name and address of the procuring entity;
the name and address of the successful supplier;
the value of the successful tender or the highest and lowest of-
fers taken into account in the award of the contract;
the date of award; and 
the type of procurement method used, and in cases where limit-
ed  tendering was used in accordance with Article XIII, a descrip-
tion of the circumstances justifying the use of limited tendering.
3. Maintenance of Documentation, Reports and Electronic Traceability 
Each procuring entity shall, for a period of at least three years from 
the date it awards a contract, maintain:
the documentation and reports of tendering procedures and 
contract awards relating to covered procurement, including 
the reports required under Article XIII;  and
data that ensure the appropriate traceability of the conduct of 
covered procurement by electronic means.
Following the above, the revised GPA of 2014 marks a new era in 
the field of public procurement liberalisation and policy. In the first in-
stance, the revised GPA builds yet another step in the further expansion 
of the agreement. The agreement’s scope has been widened, its coverage 
enlarged, and commentators remark that both the substance of the revised 
GPA provisions as well as the increased profile that flows as a result there-
of create further incentives for WTO members who are not party to the 
Agreement to accede. Therefore, the revised GPA follows the same thread 
as the past amendments to the previous text of the GPA. At the same time, 
however, the GPA does not represent merely an expansion of the previ-
ous text but mainly a revision thereof with the aim of bringing it into line 
with the current requirements and realities of public procurement. Conse-
quently, to the extent that the 2014 GPA further substantiates the funda-
mental principles and procedures upon which the parties’ public procure-
ment regimes are to be built, its text does not constitute an amendment to 
the previous Agreement but rather an effort to fundamentally streamline 
the Agreement’s content to new procuring needs. Based on the above, the 
2014 GPA represents a landmark in public procurement policy. Regard-
less of the actual assessment of the changes the revised GPA brings, the 
significance of the revised GPA stems from the fact that it constitutes the 
first attempt to modernise public procurement policy in the framework of 
the WTO 10 years after the GPA’s introduction. 17 
17 See generally Arie Reich, ‘The New Text of the Agreement on Government Procurement: 
An Analysis and Assessment’ (2009) 12(4) Journal of International Economic Law 989.  
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The above exposition and detailed description of the elements of the 
new GPA prove that the goal of public procurement liberalisation is being 
attained step by step. The more concessions are built in, the more proce-
dures become simplified and clarified, and the more the requirements are 
modernised, then more sectors open up towards liberalisation and more 
WTO member states opt to adhere to similar processes. Consequently, 
the GPA constitutes an instrument that evolves and gradually chang-
es shape and changes in detail with the aim of capturing an increasing 
number of public procurement liberalisation aspects, both regarding the 
subject matter covered as well as the parties involved. 
3 From stand-alone action to enhanced synergy: making a case for 
the promotion of public procurement liberalisation through the 
GPA’s synergy with international, regional and domestic instru-
ments 
Against the background of the stand-alone and gradual evolution 
of public procurement liberalisation under the WTO’s GPA, the ques-
tion arises as to whether any forces are available at an international, 
regional and domestic level that may assist in the promotion of the GPA 
principles or even towards their enforcement. The present paper argues 
that there are indeed three levels of synergy between the GPA and such 
instruments. At the first level, various international and regional texts 
promote principles, standards and procedures that are in line with the 
GPA’s conditions and requirements regarding public procurement liber-
alisation. Second, the very enforcement of the GPA relies on the remedies 
systems available under domestic legal orders. And last, the possible im-
provement of the remedies system under the GPA may be inspired by 
similar templates offered under other international and regional systems. 
Consequently, the overall goal of public procurement liberalisation is be-
ing attained through the levels of synergy between the GPA and various 
international, regional and domestic organs.  
3.1 The first level of synergy: promoting principles, procedures and 
standards related to public procurement liberalisation through a 
number of international, regional instruments 
Interestingly, a series of international, regional and national instru-
ments have the direct or indirect effect of promoting public procurement 
liberalisation.18 This is not to argue that these instruments necessarily 
have as their primary objective the liberalisation of procurement markets 
18 See generally Robert Anderson, ‘Renewing the WTO Agreement on Government Procure-
ment: Progress to Date and Ongoing Negotiations’ (2007) 16 Public Procurement Law Re-
view 255.
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or trade markets or even procurement as such. On the contrary, what the 
following analysis highlights and what the present article consequently 
submits is that public procurement liberalisation does not rest exclu-
sively with the GPA. While this evolves and develops, there are a num-
ber of other instruments whose specific provisions promote and enhance 
principles, standards and procedures whose substance ties in with and 
serves the interests of public procurement liberalisation. An overview of 
the key aspects of the relevant instruments can illustrate what is sug-
gested as the first level of synergy. 
 3.1.1 The 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement
The Model Law on Public Procurement was first adopted in 1994 and 
its revised version was introduced in 2011.19  It is in essence a template 
drafted with the aim of assisting states in forming and adopting their 
public procurement regimes.20
According to its Guide to Enactment, the Model Law is intended 
to serve the objectives of: (a) achieving economy and efficiency; (b) wide 
participation by suppliers and contractors, with procurement open to 
international participation as a general rule; (c) maximising competition; 
(d) ensuring fair, equal and equitable treatment; (e) assuring integrity, 
fairness and public confidence in the procurement process; and (f) pro-
moting transparency.21 In so doing, it contains a number of suggested 
procedures and principles aimed at achieving the aforementioned goals. 
In particular, and by way of example, the Model Law guarantees the 
interested parties’ right to information through prescribing specific pro-
cedures for the publication and communication of information related to 
forthcoming procurements.22  At the same time, it also seeks to streamline 
and rationalise the relevant decision-making by laying out specific rules 
and criteria for the award of contracts and the evaluation of tenders.23   
19 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (January 2011)   <http://www.uncitral.
org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement-2011/2011-Model-Law-on-Public-Pro-
curement-e.pdf> accessed 18 December 2015. 
20  See generally Caroline Nicholas, ‘Framework Agreements and the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Procurement’ (2008) 5 Public Procurement Law Review NA 220; Caroline Nicholas, ‘The 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement: The Current Reform Programme’ (2006) 6 Public 
Procurement Law Review NA 161; Caroline Nicholas ‘Remedies for Breaches of Procurement 
Rules and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement’ (2009) 18(4) Public Procurement Law 
Review NA 151. For a comparison of the UNCITRAL Model Law with the EU Procurement Di-
rective, see OECD, ‘Comparison Between the EC Procurement Directive and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law’ (2000) 6 Public Procurement Law Review 287. 
21 UNCITRAL, Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement. 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement-2011/Guide-En-
actment-Model-Law-Public-Procurement-e.pdf> accessed 18 December 2015. 
22 Articles 6, 7 and 13 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement.   
23 ibid, Arts  11, 42 et seq.  
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Following the above, it is evident that the Model Law implicitly con-
tributes to public procurement liberalisation by setting out a number 
of standards regarding the public procurement process, to which states 
opting to enact legislation under it need to adhere. In fact, in crafting the 
therein endorsed and envisaged standards, the Model Law takes into ac-
count the provisions of the WTO GPA, the EU directives (on procurement 
and remedies), the UN Convention Against Corruption, the Procurement 
Guidelines and the Consultant Guidelines of the World Bank and the 
equivalent documents of the IFIs.
It is estimated that approximately 30 states have already enacted 
legislation on the basis of the UNCITRAL Model Law template.24 
3.1.2 OECD: Recommendations and Peer Reviews
The OECD aims to promote and safeguard international standards 
in the framework of public procurement. With this aim, the Organisation 
has issued a number of recommendations fleshing out the substance of 
the supported procurement policies. These texts include: (i) the OECD 
Recommendation on Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement (2008);25 
(ii) the Recommendation on Principles for Public Governance of Public-
Private Partnerships (2012);26 (iii) the Recommendation on Fighting Bid 
Rigging in Public Procurement (2012);27 (iv) the Recommendation on Im-
proving the Environmental Performance of Public Procurement (2002);28 
and (v) the Recommendation on Anti-Corruption Proposals for Bilateral 
Aid Procurement (1996).29  
24 EBRD UNCITRAL Public Procurement Initiative, ‘2011 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public 
Procurement’(2011) <http://www.ppi-ebrd-uncitral.com/index.php/uncitral-model-law> 
accessed 18 December 2015. 
25 OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement 
[C(2008)105] <http://www.oecd.org/governance/ethics/41549036.pdf> accessed 18 De-
cember 2015. 
26 OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Public Governance of Public-
Private Partnerships [C(2012)86] <http://webnet.oecd.org/oecdacts/Instruments/ShowIn-
strumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=275&InstrumentPID=281&Lang=en&Book=> accessed 
18 December 2015. 
27 OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement 
[C(2012)115 - C(2012)115/CORR1 - C/M(2012)9] <http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/
RecommendationOnFightingBidRigging2012.pdf> accessed 18 December 2015 
28 OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Improving the Environmental Performance of 
Public Procurement [C(2002)3] <http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.
aspx?InstrumentID=46&InstrumentPID=43&Lang=en&Book=False> accessed 18 Decem-
ber 2015. 
29 OECD, Recommendation on Anti-Corruption Proposals for Bilateral Aid Procurement 
[DCD/DAC(96)11/FINAL] <http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?
InstrumentID=203&InstrumentPID=199&Lang=en&Book=> accessed 18 December 2015.  
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In light of the above, the OECD has taken a number of steps with 
a view to supporting governments in implementing the aforementioned 
principles and aiming to ensure their due adoption. More specifically, 
the OECD has introduced an online toolbox available to policy makers 
that captures emerging good practice to enhance corruption prevention 
and good management in public procurement.30   What is more, states 
may benefit from peer reviews on the basis of which leading experts from 
OECD countries offer their experience regarding the implementation of 
international public procurement standards and best practices.
3.1.3 World Bank Guidelines
The World Bank constitutes yet another institution seeking to 
support the improvement of borrower countries’ procurement systems 
through the promotion of sound public procurement policies and prac-
tices. First, the World Bank has issued detailed and specific Guidelines 
for the Procurement of Goods, Works and Non-Consulting Services Ad-
dressed to Borrowers under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants.31 
Pursuant to these, borrower countries are contractually obliged to take 
appropriate measures to reform and improve their public procurement 
systems and procedures as a condition to receiving funding from the 
World Bank. 
Moreover, the World Bank has attempted to create international 
benchmarks in the field of public procurement through the creation of 
a dedicated report that presents a cross-country analysis reflecting how 
the private sector interacts in business dealings with the governments in 
10 pilot economies.32
3.1.4 UN Conventions and International Codes
Last, the UN has equally adopted a number of conventions seeking 
to promote international standards of transparency and ethical conduct 
in the field of public procurement.33  
30 OECD, Public Procurement Toolbox <http://www.oecd.org/governance/procurement/
toolbox/> accessed 18 December 2015. 
31 World Bank, Guidelines on the Procurement of Goods, Works and Non-Consulting Servic-
es under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by World Bank Borrowers (2011)  <http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/278019-1308067833011/
Procurement_GLs_English_Final_Jan2011.pdf> accessed 18 December 2015. 
32 World Bank, Benchmarking Public Procurement <http://rru.worldbank.org/Public-
Procurement/> accessed 18 December 2015; World Bank, Benchmarking Public Procure-
ment 2015 Pilot Report Assessing Procurement Systems in 10 Economies <http://rru.
worldbank.org/Public-Procurement/~/media/GIAWB/PublicProcurement/Documents/
Reports/Benchmarking-Public-Procurement-2015.ashx> accessed 18 December 2015. 
33 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, United Nations Convention 
against Corruption: Implementing Procurement-related Aspects <http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_1/INF.2.pdf> accessed 18 December 2015. 
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In particular, Article 9 of the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption stipulates that: 
Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamen-
tal principles of its legal system, take the necessary steps 
to establish appropriate systems of procurement, based on 
transparency, competition and objective criteria in decision-
making, that are effective, inter alia, in preventing corruption.
What is more, the Convention foresees in the same Article that ‘[w]
here appropriate, measures [shall be addressed] to regulate matters re-
garding personnel responsible for procurement, such as declaration of 
interest in particular public procurements, screening procedures and 
training requirements’.
At the same time, international standards relevant for public pro-
curement procedures may be traced in a series of other UN Instruments. 
The UN International Code of Conduct for Public Officials is one such 
example. Jurich notes in respect thereto that although this ‘is not specifi-
cally aimed at public procurement, it does (nonetheless) address conflicts 
of interest in general and contains common elements of monitoring’.34 
3.1.5 Conclusions 
It therefore flows from the above that a number of international and 
regional instruments create and promote international principles on 
good governance, transparency, anti-corruption and non-discrimination. 
These standards and principles form the very foundations of and pre-
conditions for a rational, modernised and liberalised public procurement 
mechanism. Based on this observation, the current paper argues that 
the goal of public procurement liberalisation is being achieved through 
a dialogue between different sources of law within the international legal 
order. The particular and specific goals, standards and principles ad-
vanced by the GPA are being directly or indirectly reinforced by a number 
of other international instruments. It is thus clear that the objective of 
public procurement liberalisation is being substantiated through and ad-
vanced by synergy between different international instruments. 
3.2 The second level of synergy: safeguarding the GPA’s en-
forcement through actions brought before the domestic legal order
Moving forward, the proper implementation of the public procure-
ment liberalisation policy under the GPA relies on the remedies available 
under domestic legal orders. In substantiating this argument, the pre-
34 James Jurich, ‘International Approaches to Conflicts of Interest in Public Procurement: 
A Comparative Review’ (2012) 7(4) European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law 
Review 242. 
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sent paper provides an overview of the different enforcement procedures 
available under the WTO, namely the standard DSU Procedure and the 
Bid Challenge System, before elaborating on how the instruments offered 
under the domestic legal orders secure the enforcement and thus the 
proper implementation of the GPA and subsequently the WTO’s public 
procurement policy. 
3.2.1 The standard DSU procedure
Under Article XX GPA, the standard DSU procedure constitutes one 
of the means to enforce the Agreement’s provisions. In particular, the DSU 
provides a mechanism for the resolution of disputes between WTO mem-
bers who are party to the Agreement. Consequently, the pre-contractual 
or contractual dispute between a bidder or provider and the contracting 
authority is transformed for the purposes of the DSU into a dispute be-
tween the parties’ governments. Should a government decide to take up 
such a complaint lodged by its national bidder or provider against the 
authorities of another GPA party, it will first need to attempt to resolve 
the dispute in an amicable manner. If such a settlement between the 
parties cannot be reached, then the applicant state may request a panel 
to be established to hear the case. The panel’s task is to provide a report 
to the parties concerned, which is then adopted by the DSU. The latter 
would then request the state in breach to repeal any or all measures that 
contravene the WTO principles. If the state fails to do so, then the DSB 
may authorise the unilateral suspension of the application of the GPA in 
the territory affected by the violation.35  
Following the above, enforcing the GPA under the DSU presents two 
important shortcomings that go against the very nature and special char-
acteristics of public procurement. 
First, following the DSU’s provisions, the GPA is implemented at an 
inter-governmental level: it is the WTO member who is party to the GPA 
that needs to bring a case against another WTO member who is party 
to the GPA on behalf of a private individual alleging infringements of the 
Agreement’s provisions.  Indeed, this is the standard procedure for the 
resolution of disputes under the WTO. However, it is not clear whether this 
general procedure adequately addresses the specificities of public procure-
ment. This is so because public procurement takes place at an individual 
level: various contracting authorities in each of the GPA parties publish 
and conduct procurement procedures in the course of which individual 
bidders and contractors may observe irregularities contrary to the provi-
sions of the GPA. In order for these irregularities to be brought against 
the infringing contracting authorities, though, the individual bidders need 
35 Christopher Bovis, EC Public Procurement Law and Regulation (OUP 2006) 94.  
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to pass the hurdle of convincing their national governments not only of 
the existence of a breach but also of the importance of bringing an action 
against another WTO member. It is therefore clear that the implementa-
tion of the GPA relies on the discretion of a national government which 
will naturally need to balance any political interests involved when decid-
ing whether or not to act upon a bidder’s or contractor’s complaint. Even 
though this finding holds true for any procedure under the WTO’s DSU, 
it is not clear whether a highly deferential procedure such as that under 
the DSU is indeed the best way to secure the implementation of parties’ 
commitments and duties in the context of a policy that is as fragmented 
as the various individual procurement procedures of different contracting 
authorities in each of the WTO members who are parties to the GPA.  
What is more, the DSU procedure aims to have the infringing party 
change its procurement policy and comply with the prescriptions of the 
GPA in the future. However, the DSU procedure does not provide for a 
specific remedy to repair the procuring opportunities lost as a result of 
the alleged breaches. For example, as Bovis notes, a panel may not order 
the re-tendering of a procedure vitiated by infringements of the GPA.36 
Consequently, any sought remedies have a purely prospective nature in-
stead of a reparatory or restitutional one.
It thus flows from the above that although the DSU procedure appli-
cable to the GPA is fully in line with the general principles regarding the 
resolution of disputes in the context of the WTO, this may not represent 
the best available system to address the special particularities of public 
procurement policy and procedure. 
3.2.2 The bid challenge system37
In order to remedy the aforementioned shortcomings, the GPA intro-
duced what has been characterised as a unique feature within the WTO 
enforcement regime: the bid challenge system. Article XVIII of the revised 
GPA stipulates that: 
1. Each Party shall provide a timely, effective, transparent and 
non-discriminatory administrative or judicial review proce-
dure through which a supplier may challenge:
a.  a breach of the Agreement;  or
b. where the supplier does not have a right to challenge di-
rectly a breach of the Agreement under the domestic law of 
36 ibid. 
37 See generally Sue Arrowsmith, ‘The Character and Role of National Challenge Procedure 
Under the Government Procurement Agreement’ (2002) 11 Public Procurement Law Re-
view 235; Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace (n 1); Arie Reich, International Public Procure-
ment Law: The Evolution of International Regimes on Public Purchasing (Kluwer International 
1999) 307-312. 
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a Party, a failure to comply with a Party’s measures imple-
menting this Agreement,
 arising in the context of a covered procurement, in which the 
supplier has, or has had, an interest.  The procedural rules for 
all challenges shall be in writing and made generally available. 
 (…)
4  Each Party shall establish or designate at least one impartial 
administrative or judicial authority that is independent of its 
procuring entities to receive and review a challenge by a sup-
plier arising in the context of a covered procurement.
 (…)
6. Each Party shall ensure that a review body that is not a court 
shall have its decision subject to judicial review or have proce-
dures that provide that:
a. the procuring entity shall respond in writing to the chal-
lenge and disclose all relevant documents to the review 
body;
b. the participants to the proceedings (hereinafter referred to 
as ‘participants’) shall have the right to be heard prior to a 
decision of the review body being made on the challenge;
c. the participants shall have the right to be represented and 
accompanied;
d. the participants shall have access to all proceedings;
e. the participants shall have the right to request that the 
proceedings take place in public and that witnesses may be 
presented;  and
f. the review body shall make its decisions or recommenda-
tions in a timely fashion, in writing, and shall include an 
explanation of the basis for each decision or recommenda-
tion. 
Following the above, the bid challenge mechanism allows interest-
ed bidders to challenge procuring procedures that are in breach of the 
GPA before the competent bodies of the procuring state.38 This mecha-
nism, which is sui generis by WTO standards,39 best safeguards the cor-
38 PA Messerlin, ‘Agreement on Public Procurement’ in OECD, The  New World Trading 
System: Readings (OECD 1995) 65: ‘this is a unique innovation in the GATT system; it is the 
first time that direct access to enforcement procedures under the regulations of the import-
ing country has been granted to foreign firms within the context of a GATT text’. 
39 Arrowsmith (n 4) 385 notes that the bid challenge system ‘marks a departure from the 
approach of most other WTO agreements. In general these do not require affected private 
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rect implementation and application of the GPA’s provisions by shifting, 
in essence, the burden of GPA compliance monitoring and surveillance 
from national governments to interested stakeholders. This shift offers 
enhanced guarantees and assurances for the enforcement of the GPA: 
interested parties have both concrete and increased incentives for GPA 
rules to be observed. At the same time, they also have inside knowledge 
and experience on the procuring authorities’ procedures and decisions.40 
For example, Mosoti highlights the practical significance of bidders and 
contractors taking the lead in securing the GPA’s enforcement, by noting 
that: ‘most violations of the WTO GPA take place at an individual level, 
therefore it is crucial that the applicant is in the position to challenge the 
procuring agency’s award with regard to specific contracts’.41 
Next to safeguarding the correct application and implementation of 
the GPA, the bid challenge provision also ensures that applicants have 
access to effective and timely remedies under domestic law. In particular, 
Article XVIII foresees that: 
Each Party shall adopt or maintain procedures that provide for:
a. rapid interim measures to preserve the supplier’s oppor-
tunity to participate in the procurement.  Such interim 
measures may result in suspension of the procurement pro-
cess. The procedures may provide that overriding adverse 
consequences for the interests concerned, including the 
public interest, may be taken into account when deciding 
whether such measures should be applied.  Just cause for 
not acting shall be provided in writing;  and
b. where a review body has determined that there has been a 
breach or a failure as referred to in paragraph 1, corrective 
action or compensation for the loss or damages suffered, 
which may be limited to either the costs for the preparation 
of the tender or the costs relating to the challenge, or both 
(emphasis added).   
Therefore, in contrast to the remedies under the DSU system, the 
subject matter and nature of which is strictly prospective in nature, the 
parties to be given a right to enforce WTO rules, but rely mainly on inter-governmental en-
forcement. Private challenge procedures are required under some of these provisions, but 
none go as far as the GPA. In particular, their procedural requirements and obligations on 
remedies are not as detailed or stringent as those of the GPA and they generally give greater 
deference to states’ own national traditions of review in the particular area concerned’. 
40 See, eg, Aaditya Mattoo, ‘The Government Procurement Agreement: Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory’ (October 1996) WTO Staff Working Paper, No TISD-96-03 <http://hdl.han-
dle.net/10419/90696> accessed 18 December 2015. 
41 Victor Mosoti, ‘Reforming the Laws on Public Procurement in the Developing World: The 
Example of Kenya’ (2005) 54(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 621. 
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bid challenge system allows for timely remedies, which may also take the 
form of interim measures. This is extremely important, especially if one 
is to take into account the track record of cases brought under the DSU 
in which the panel ruled on violations of the GPA but nonetheless ended 
up merely accepting commitments that similar breaches would not be re-
peated in the future, due to the fact that the purchases under review had 
already been concluded.42 The importance of timely remedies for securing 
the correct implementation and enforcement of the GPA is captured by 
Mavroidis and Hoekman who remark that ‘the nature of procurement is 
such that most of the time, unless rapid action can be taken, inconsist-
encies with the Agreement will de facto be tolerated as firms will not have 
an interest in bringing a case’.43 
3.2.3 Conclusions
It therefore derives from the above that the bid challenge system be-
fore the competent bodies of the contracting state constitutes an effective 
enforcement and remedy mechanism that corresponds to the particulari-
ties and special needs of public procurement.44  In other words, the cor-
rect implementation and enforcement of public procurement liberalisa-
tion under the GPA rests on a mechanism stipulated under the GPA itself 
and substantiated and effectuated through the domestic order of the WTO 
members who are party to the Agreement. Consequently, the effective ap-
plication of the GPA is in essence guaranteed through a synergy between 
the GPA itself and the relevant provisions of each individual domestic order 
that allow each bidder to challenge any observed irregularities.   
3.3 The third level of synergy: using the EU Remedies Directive and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law as templates for improving the GPA’s enforcement 
system
Finally, although the current bid challenge system under the GPA 
matches the particular characteristics of public procurement enforce-
42 Norway — Tendering Procedures on Trondheim Toll Ring Project: Report of the Panel ad-
opted by the Committee on Government Procurement (13 May 1992) BISD 40S/319. For 
a summary of the case with an emphasis on its remedies, see Petros Mavroidis, Trade in 
Goods (OUP 2012) 809.  
43 Petros Mavroidis and Bernard Hoekman, ‘The WTO’s Agreement on Government Pro-
curement: Expanding Disciplines, Declining Membership?’ (1995) 63(4) Public Procurement 
Law Review 69. 
44 The particularities of construing appropriate remedies in the field of public procurement 
stem from the fact that public procuring constitutes a ‘a single event, costly to reverse, and 
where modifications to national rules of general application would not necessarily provide 
adequate guarantees for non-recurrence’. See Martin Dischendorfer, ‘The Existence and 
Development of Multilateral Rules on Government Procurement Under the Framework of 
the WTO’ (2000) 9 Public Procurement Law Review 1; Patrick Low, Aaditya Matoo and Ar-
vind Subramanian, ‘Government Procurement in Services’ (1996) 20(1) World Competition 
16.  
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ment, it does show a number of weaknesses. It is therefore worth explor-
ing whether the weaknesses may be adequately addressed through the 
examples offered by other public procurement remedies systems. Against 
this background, the present paper submits that a third synergy is be-
ing offered by the possible use of the EU Remedies Directive and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law as templates for improving the GPA’s enforcement 
system. With this proposition in mind, the current section first lays out 
the various shortcomings of the current bid challenge system before ex-
plaining how the aforementioned examples could assist in improving it.   
3.3.1 Shortcomings in the current bid challenge system
We have already established that the bid challenge system presents 
an enforcement mechanism that matches the particularities of the public 
procurement process as a whole. This is not to say, however, that the rel-
evant provisions under the GPA do not entail any weaknesses whatsoever. 
From a structural perspective, the following points are worth highlighting. 
First, according to Article XVIII paragraph 7 of the GPA, each party 
should adopt or maintain procedures that provide for: 
where a review body has determined that there has been a 
breach or a failure as referred to in paragraph 1, corrective 
action or compensation for the loss or damages suffered, 
which may be limited to either the costs for the preparation of 
the tender or the costs relating to the challenge, or both” (em-
phasis added).
Consequently, compensation for a successful challenger is limited to 
the costs for tender preparation or protest. In light thereof, concerns have 
been expressed as to whether this measure to claim damages constitutes 
an incentive that is strong enough to guarantee the correct application of 
the GPA through private actions.45   
Second, the Agreement does not provide for or impose any restric-
tions on the practice of settlements. The prospect of unconditional settle-
ments between procurement officials and potential challengers inevitably 
affects the enforcement of the GPA. Equally, the possibility of settlements 
between successful and unsuccessful bidders may lead to ‘collusive out-
comes’ contrary to the GPA’s provision.46  
45 Mattoo (n 40):  ‘the anticipated gain from private action, and the incentives for it, are not 
very high. Consequently, the scope for private litigation to exercise a socially desirable correc-
tive or deterrent effect is limited’ 2. For a discussion on what remedies would be appropriate, 
see eg Sue Arrowsmith, ‘The Character and Role of National Challenge Procedures Under the 
Government Procurement Agreement’ (2002) 11 Public Procurement Law Review 235.
46 Xinglin Zhang ‘Supplier Review as a Mechanism for Securing Compliance with Govern-
ment Procurement Rules: A Critical Perspective’ (2007) 16(5) Public Procurement Law Re-
view 325. 
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Last, the enforcement mechanism does not provide for the challenge 
and judicial review of bail-outs in cases where governments choose to 
reimburse the unanticipated cost overruns of a firm which has won a 
procurement contract.
Other than the above architectural elements, the relevant literature 
also picks up substantive shortcomings. These weaknesses may be sum-
marised as follows: first, the GPA allows for the possibility of entrusting 
the initial challenge to a non-judicial review body; second, there is ambi-
guity regarding the extent of the corrective powers of the review bodies, 
and, especially, whether the review body must have the authority to set 
aside a signed contract whose award violates the Agreement.47 
Following the above, empirical research reveals that these short-
comings in the bid challenge system have on many occasions prevented 
suppliers from bringing infringement proceedings against the contracting 
authorities before domestic bodies.48 In many instances, suppliers have 
expressed their distrust of the domestic remedies regimes and have noted 
that they are in any event afraid that any action brought under the do-
mestic review process could jeopardise their prospects of future business 
and dealings with the competent national authorities.49 
It therefore arises from the above that, although a step in the right 
direction, the bid challenge procedure as envisaged in the GPA does not 
completely address the full range of considerations and concerns related 
to the Agreement’s enforcement and implementation.
In fact, it is less than clear whether the revised GPA has succeeded 
in remedying the shortcomings laid out above. For example, Reich con-
siders that the modernisation envisaged under the revised GPA has not 
at all improved the Agreement’s enforcement system.50 Reich uses three 
main arguments. First, the updated text does not elaborate adequately 
on the requisite independence that review bodies need to enjoy. Second, 
the revised provisions on interim measures do not foresee the right to 
demand the correction of committed breaches. On the contrary, their 
objective is to preserve the supplier’s ‘opportunity to participate in the 
procurement’. Last, the revised text has relieved the review body from 
47 Sue Arrowsmith, John Linarelli and Don Wallace Regulating Public Procurement: National 
and International Perspectives (Kluwer International 2000) 772: the authors note that the 
review bodies in many countries are indeed reluctant to interfere with contracts already 
concluded. 
48 Reich (n 17).  
49 Sue Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (Sweet & Maxwell 2005) 
1435. For an empirical study on the factors why suppliers are reluctant to lodge formal 
challenges in the context of the EU, see Despina Pachnou ‘Bidders’ Use of Mechanisms to 
Enforce EC Procurement Law’ (2005) 14 Public Procurement Law Review 256. 
50 In fact, in its scoreboard Reich assesses the changes on legal remedies as a failure.
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the preliminary duty of examining the merits of the complaint and find-
ing whether a violation of the rules has occurred. Following the above 
observations, Reich reaches the conclusion that the revised GPA in fact 
weakens the effectiveness of the GPA’s enforcement and remedies system 
instead of improving it. 
Consequently, although the rationale behind the bid challenge sys-
tem is of a nature and class that reflect the uniqueness of the public 
procurement procedure, there are nonetheless weaknesses in the mecha-
nism’s content and application as laid down under the GPA. Commenta-
tors note that these shortcomings have resisted the GPA’s recent revision. 
3.3.2 The EU Remedies Directive and the UNCITRAL Model Law as tem-
plates       towards the GPA’s future improvement 
The above sections have established that Article XXVIII GPA, al-
though tuned to the basic characteristics of the public procurement pro-
cess, nonetheless shows some weaknesses and spots for further improve-
ment. The natural question, then, is what the best and most efficient 
way would be to address the traced shortcomings within the GPA’s bid 
challenge system. 
This paper suggests that the key to improving the GPA’s bid system 
lies in other legal instruments that adopt similar bid challenge systems, 
namely the EU Remedies Directive and the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
For what it is worth, the relevant literature51 has already commented 
on the fact that the foundations of the bid challenge systems under the 
GPA are quite similar to those under the EU’s Remedies Directive on 
Public Procurement.52 With that in mind, reaching out to the remedy 
mechanisms of the EU Directive gains further legitimacy. And, indeed, 
the updated remedies system, as prescribed under the EU Directives, 
rests on three principles that resolve to a great extent the weaknesses 
traced under the GPA’s bid challenge system. In particular, the EU Direc-
tive’s remedies regime is premised on the following three doctrines: 
• The doctrine of standstill periods: no contract should be conclud-
ed following an award decision under the procurement rules be-
51 See generally Xingling Zhang, ‘Constructing a System of Challenge Provisions to Comply 
with the Agreement on Government Procurement’ in Sue Arrowsmith and Robbert D Ander-
son (eds), The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform (CUP 2011) 
483.   
52 Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 Decem-
ber 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to im-
proving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts 
(Text with EEA relevance) [2007] OJ L335/31. For an overview, see <http://ec.europa.eu/
growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-implementation/remedies-directives/in-
dex_en.htm> accessed 18 December 2015. 
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fore the expiry of a ‘standstill period’ of at least 10 days from the 
day following the date on which the contract award decision is 
sent to the ‘tenderers concerned’. Tenderers are not ‘concerned’ if 
they have previously been excluded and have already been noti-
fied of their exclusion.
• The doctrine of contract suspension: the new Remedies Directive 
requires that once an application for review has been made, the 
contract under review cannot be entered into until the court has 
made a decision regarding the application.53 
• The doctrine of ineffectiveness: the new Remedies Directive states 
that public contracts will be ‘ineffective’ where there is a breach of 
the public procurement rules.54
Along the same lines, the UNCITRAL Model Law stipulates a list of 
available remedies whose range appears to addresses the concerns voiced 
against the respective remedies system under the GPA. More specifically, 
according to Article 67(9) of the Model Law, the competent national body 
may take any of the following actions in deciding on any lodged com-
plaint: 
(a) Prohibit the procuring entity from acting, taking a decision or 
following a procedure that is not in compliance with the provi-
sions of this Law;
(b) Require the procuring entity that has acted or proceeded in a 
manner that is not in compliance with the provisions of this 
Law to act, to take a decision or to proceed in a manner that is 
in compliance with the provisions of this Law;
(c) Overturn in whole or in part an act or a decision of the procur-
ing entity that is not in compliance with the provisions of this 
Law other than any act or decision bringing the procurement 
contract or the framework agreement into force;
(d) Revise a decision by the procuring entity that is not in com-
pliance with the provisions of this Law [other than any act or 
decision bringing the procurement contract or the framework 
agreement into force];
(e)  Confirm a decision of the procuring entity; 
(f)  Overturn the award of a procurement contract or a framework 
agreement that has entered into force in a manner that is not 
in compliance with the provisions of this Law and, if notice of 
53 Directive 2007/66/EC, Art 2(3).
54 Directive 2007/66/EC, Art 2(d).   
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the award of the procurement contract or the framework agree-
ment has been published, order the publication of notice of the 
overturning of the award; 
(g) Order that the procurement proceedings be terminated; 
(h)  Dismiss the application; 
(i)  Require the payment of compensation for any reasonable costs 
incurred by the supplier or contractor submitting an applica-
tion as a result of an act or decision of, or procedure followed 
by, the procuring entity in the procurement proceedings that is 
not in compliance with the provisions of this Law, and for any 
loss or damages suffered[, which shall be limited to the costs of 
the preparation of the submission or the costs relating to the 
application, or both]; or
(j) Take such alternative action as is appropriate in the circum-
stances.
What is more, the Model Law also foresees a standstill period be-
tween the publication of the award decision and the actual execution of 
the awarded contract.55
3.3.3 Conclusions
The above analysis has presented the available remedies under the 
EU’s Remedies Directive and the UNCITRAL Model Law to show that these 
incorporate and address to a certain extent the concerns and criticisms 
expressed against the weaknesses of the bid challenge system under the 
WTO’s GPA. Consequently, these could be used as a leading paradigm 
and inspiration for the GPA’s further amendment and development. Fol-
lowing on from this, the general discussion regarding the future improve-
ment of the GPA’s bid challenge system reveals yet another shade of syn-
ergy between the WTO’s GPA and the European and International legal 
orders. This is so because the EU Remedies Directive and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law may constitute an inspiration, a benchmark and perhaps a 
flexible template for the GPA’s upcoming revisions of the bid challenge 
provision. 
4 General Conclusions  
The evolution and development of the WTO’s GPA is based on a purely 
pragmatic approach. The Agreement’s shape-taking and expansion have 
been gradual and escalating: the WTO members and parties to the Agree-
ment submit to the GPA’s scope as many areas and subjects as they feel 
55 UNICTRAL Model Law, Art 22.  
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comfortable with at a time. The GPA has, therefore, been structured in 
such a way as to follow its parties’ needs with each subsequent round of 
negotiations, revisions or amendments, taking the status quo one step 
closer to the overarching goal of public procurement liberalisation.
In parallel with this process, however, the interests of public pro-
curement liberalisation are also served through the interaction of the GPA 
with other international, regional and domestic instruments. This paper 
has presented and analysed three such instances of synergy created as 
a result of this interaction, all of which assist in the better application, 
implementation and enforcement of the principles proclaimed and the 
provisions enshrined under the GPA. First, the principles, standards and 
procedures of the GPA are promoted through a number of international 
and regional texts, including model laws and soft law instruments. Sec-
ond, the successful enforcement of GPA relies on the remedies systems 
available under domestic legal orders. Third, the possible improvement of 
the remedies system under the GPA may be inspired by similar templates 
offered under other international and regional systems. 
Where does all this leave us? It is fairly obvious that public procure-
ment liberalisation is not to be achieved by means of a protracted sprint, 
but rather through a well-organised and rehearsed marathon. What this 
article has aimed to highlight, though, is that just like every marathon, 
the process of liberalising public procurement is not a one-man show. On 
the contrary, its success relies and rests on the synergies generated from 
the dialogue and interaction between the actual text of the WTO’s GPA 
and relevant international, regional and domestic instruments. 
